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CAN THE GERMAN WORKMEN'S INSURANCE LAW BE
ADAPTED TO AMERICAN CONDITIONS?
The Industrial Accidents Commission of the State of Pennsylvania has drafted and published a bill to provide compensation for
injured workmen, which is modeled after the English law. Soon
after such publication there was presented to that commission on
behalf of the Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association a proposed
workmen's compensation act, modeled after the German law.
Thereby a clear issue was presented as to the relative merits of
the English and German systems of compensation for work-injuries, and as to their comparative adaptability to conditions in
America.
In this paper, I will endeavor to present the arguments in
favor of the choice of the English system as the model for us to
follow.
The English law is comparatively simple- and its operations
are readily comprehended. The German law, on the contrary,
is extremely complex, and it is difficult to acquire a correct understanding of the sum of its essential detzils. In explaining the two
laws, therefore, ;t will be necessary to dwell at greater length upon
the German law, so as to elucidate its weaknesses and dangers and
the difficulties in the way of adapting any part of it to American
conditions. We can then intelligently compare the respective
merits and demerits of the two systems of compensation law.
(67)
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The British "Workmen's Compensation Act, x9o6" applies
to wage-earners in practically all employments. It replaces the
Act of 1897, which applied to certain enumerated industries only,
and the Act of igoo, which applied to agricultural employments.
This Act imposes upon the employer a direct liability to compensate his employees for accidental injuries arising out of and in the
course of their employment. Some enumerated occupational
diseases are treated as injuries, and must be compensated for accordingly. The scale of compensation is approximately 5o per
cent. of the estimated wage loss from injury, beginningat theend
of the first week, and under conditions reverting back to the date
of injuiy.
The statute does not relieve the employer from liability for
full damages at Common Law, or from liability for limited damages under an earlier statute; but those liabilities are incurred only
where the employer or a vice-principal has been guilty of serious
and certain fault, and they are practically negligible.
The employer may insure or not, at his option. If he does
insure, the insurance does not relieve him from his individual
liability.
Disputes may be settled by arbitration--either by a: standing
board voluntarily organized by an employer and his employees or
otherwise,-fr by a judge of the proper County Court- sitting as
arbitrator and under suihmary procedure.
An employer and his workmen may by agreement substitute
a scheme of mutual benefit insurance in place of the law, provided
that the benefits to the workmen thereunder are equivalent to
their benefits under the law, plus their contributions if any.,
The German "Workmen's Insurance Law" (codified in x91t),
is divided into three branches:
The Sickness Insurance Law.
The Accident Insurance Law.
The Invalidity Insurance Law.
This system of social insurance legislation was in large part
a development of old established usages and institutions. Workmen's sickness insurance associati(ns were quite general throughout large parts of Germany, and the Sickness Insurance Law
simply made such insurance universal and compulsory, and re-
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quired employers' contributions. And the requirement of employers' contributions is based upon a pre-existing legal liability
of employers in many occupations to care for their sick employees,
a liability similar to that which exists in our maritime law. And,
similarly, the Accident Insurance Law is, to a degree, a development and amendment of the pre-existing Employers' Liability
Law.
The sickness insurance is the basis of the entire system. Although it provides for the care of the sick for twenty-six weeks
only, yet it disburses annually more than double the sum disbursed
by the accident insurance.

(In

19o9,

it disbursed 333,000,000

marks as against 16i,ooo,ooo marks disbursed'by the accident
associations). It takes care of injured workmen for the first
thirteen weeks after accidents without expense to the accident
insurance; and, under certain conditions, for further periods at
the expense of the accident insurance. It thus relieves the accident insurance of nearly all care and expense relative to injuries
lasting less than thirteen weeks.
These three branches of the Workmen's Insurance Law are
so intimately correlated and interdependent, that we cannot extract the Accident Insurance Law by itself and then expect it to
work satisfactorily. Both in theory. and in practice, it is an organic part of a system and not an independent unit.
This code of laws is elaborately formulated (in over z8oo
sections), is carefully framed and fitted to suit the peculiar usages
and conditions in Germany, is founded upon a system of close
control by Government over the conduct of individuals, and has
been unusually well administered. In many respects, it has been
highly successful, and as a whole deserves admiration and respectful consideration. But there are increasing doubts about its
permanent success, and very serious difficulties and objections to
applying it or any integral part of it to the radically different conditions existing in our country.
As to the accident insurance branch of the Workmen's Insurance Law: As originally proposed by Bismarck, it was to have
been a bureaucratic state-insurance law, to be maintained by the
taxation of employers and workmen. Under the criticism of jurists
and industrial experts, however, it became, before enactment in
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1884, a collective employers' liability law, secured by insurance
in highly autonomous employers' trade mutual insurance associations, subject to state regulation. Workmen's contributions
were omitted, except as received indirectly through- the sickness
insurance; and the German Accident Insurance Law now rests and
always has rested upon a juridical principle of employers' liability for compensation as a substitute for employers' liability
for damages in tort. That liability is the basis of the law; and the
insurance is only an ancillary method of effectuating the purpose
of the liability.
The Accident Insurance Law is sub-divided into three branches:
The Industrial Accident Insurance Law.
The Agricultural Accident Insurance Law.
The Navigation Accident Insurance Law.
These three laws do not cover wage-earners in all employments.
It is unnecessary to discuss the Navigation Accident Law.
As to the Agricultural Accident Law, it is sufficient to note here
that German experience shows that insurance of agricultural labor
presents a problem radically different from that of insuring industrial labor; and therefore the German law devotes a distinct
code of about x3o sections to it. The disposition of the American
admirers of the German law seems to be to follow exclusively the
Industrial Accident Law and to apply it generally to all employments. Therefore it is appropriate to elucidate particularly that
branch of the accident law, so that we may understand the machinery anid conditions requisite to its successful operation and
may judge of its suitability for application to non-industrial employments.
With special provisions covering public, employments, the
Industrial Accident Insurance Law places the liability for compensation upon employers' trade mutual insurance associations,
there being generally a separate association of all employers in
each trade or groun of allied trades throughout the empire, or in
each of some large territorial divisions. Membership in the proper
association is compulsory. These associations are highly autonomous. Some of them are divided into almost equally autonomous sections, the sections being substantially voluntary divi-
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sions of the associations. There are 66 associations, comprising593 sections.
Some have "branch institutes." These organizations are
established in some trades to take care of the small irresponsible
employers, who are likely to run up liabilities against the.associations without adequate return. Members of branch institutes
are charged premiums high enough to maintain "capitalized value
reserves," and have little or no voice in the management of the
associations.
Subject to governmental control and regulation, the associations or sections: (a) Have framed their own constitutions and
make their own by-laws. (b) Fix the insurance rates charged to
their members. (c) Make and enforce safety regulations. (The
workmen have some representation in the conferences for the
adoption of safety regulations.)
Except in the "Engineering and Excavating Association"
and in the "Branch Institutes," the funds to pay the liabilities of
the associations are raised upon the deferred assessment basis,
without reserves to cover outstanding liabilities, but with provisions for small reserves to provide for emergencies and periods of
depression.
Payments are made through the Post Office.
Benefits begin at the end of the thirteenth week after injury,
and consist of periodical payments amounting to 66 per cent. of
the wage loss upon wages up to $428 and upon one-third of any
excess. There are also some complex provisions for medical care,
to be explained later.
The procedure after an accident is about as follows: In the
first place the police investigate all injuries. The injured workmen
are cared for during the first thirteen weeks by their sickness
insurance associations, and thereafter-if still disabled-receive
pensions and necessary medical care from their employer's accident
insurance association. That .association makes an ex parte investigation (to which witnesses may be subpoenaed, etc.), decides
what it deems to be due the injured workman, and makes an offer
of award. If that offer is unsatisfactory to the workman, he may
appeal to. the local insurance office (formerly to a Board of Arbitration); and from the decision of such office a second appeal lies
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to the highest insurance office (of the Empire or of the State).
Under certain conditions, the accident association may revise its
award,; and from that revised award a new series of appeals lies.
Some objections to and difficulties with the German Industrial
Accident Insurance Law are:
(i) The correct marshalling of all employers and their organi.zation into trade associations is a difficult task, and entails not
only much initial trouble and expense, but also continuing disputes and litigation. All classifications by trades are necessarily
arbitrary, and it is frequently a doubtful question in which of
several associations a particular establishment rightly belongs.
And between such associations there are often serious differences
of rates. The matter of assignment to an association and of transfer from one association to another rests in the discretion of the
Insurance Office. Conrequently, there arise many disputes about
assignments and appeals for transfers; and the officials are subject
to political influences in regard thereto. And transfers entail
serious difficulties and considerable injustice in the adjustment of
outstanding liabilities as between the associations.
(2) The practice of the majority of the associations of omitting to maintain reserves to cover outstanding liabilities-the
reserves maintained being sufficient merely for emergencies and
periods of depression,-and of levying assessments sufficient only
to meet payments falling due during the current year, incurs such
serious economic danger and has so many inherent disadvantages
that Germany alone has ventured to permit it. Its disadvantages
and the objections to it are as follows:
(a) While it starts off with pleasingly low rates, it must
eventually result in unduly high rates. The universal satisfaction
at first felt with the German law was consequently ephemeral.
That condition is passing. There are now some loud complaints
from employers, and their dissatisfaction will increase, as rates
continue to rise, as they must for many years to come. The rates
in Germany today average about treble what they were in the beginning. It is calculated that they will not reach their stable
maximum for some twenty years more. How much higher they
will then be, no one knows, but the majority guess is that they
will again double.
(b) This practice conceals the cost of insurance. No one

knows what is the true cost of, as distinguished from the current
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price charge,] for, insuring compensation in any given trade in
Germany today.
(c) This practice once embarked upon, the law cannot be
changed without serious embarrassments; for there will be heavy
liabilities to be liquidated. The figures for the industrialassociations alone are not available; but the outstanding capitalized liabilities of all the German accident associations in I9io were estimated at $271,900,ooo, their reserves at $75,930,ooo, and their
deficiencies at $195,970,000. Our hazards and rates of wages
being approximately double those of Germany, we can estimate
the probable deficiencies under an application of this practice in
America at about four times those of Germany, relatively to the
number of workmen affected. Under the English law, on the other
hand, there are no deficiencies to be liquidated, and that law could be
radically changed tomorrow if deemed desirable, without disturbing existing insurance liabilities.
(d) This practice handicaps new establishments by compelling
them to assume the liability for and to pay a material proportion,
of the losses of their pre-established competitors. And it imposes
upon successful establishments the burden of liability for pensions
for injuries incurred in establishments of defunct and insolvent
competitors. It is obvious that if a large proportion of establishments in any trade should shut down the financial liability thereby
shifted upon the survivors would be ruinous. In this respect the
dangers and defects of the German industrial accident insurance
are analogous to those of volmntary mutual life insuranice.
(e) Finally, this practice is subject to the danger that the
accumulated liabilities of the associations, which are in effect
mortgages on the various branches of industry, may become so
burdensome in a period of general and prolonged depression and
contraction, as to crush the industries of the country or state
affected in competition with the industries of other countries not
similarly burdened. To meet the increasing cost of overhead
charges for past indebtedness in a period of continued prosperity,
rising prices and expanding industry is comparatively easy. But
to liquidate a heavy indebtedness, carried over from the past,
under opposite conditions is an entirely different matter.
(3) This law compels insurance where insurance is unnecessary,
and thus imposes a useless expense merely to round out a paper
scheme. Railroads and large companies with many separate establishments, having their assets and risks well distributed may
properly meet their compensation liabilities as current expenses.
and have no need of insurance. To force them into a mutual
scheme is an imposition upon them.
(4) The arbitration provisions of this law result in far more
litigation than the judicial procedure provided for in the English
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law; and the process of adjustment with the insurance associations
is more irritating to workmen than the direct negotiations with the
employers or their insurers, which are the primary mode of settlement in England.
To compare the litigation under the German and English
systems: In Germany, in z9o9, there were 422,076 cases wherein

compensation was awarded by the associations, of which 76,352
(18.9 per cent.) were appealed,'of which appealed cases 22,794
(5.4 per cent.) were again appealed to the highest insurance offices.
In Great Britain, in x9o9, there were 335,953 new compensation
cases. In all 8,254 cases (2Y2 per cent.)-went to Court under the
compensation law (besides 298 cases under the tort law). But
of the compensation cases, the majority were settled by simple
orders, etc., and only 4,105 (IY per cent.) were tried. Of these
latter cases, 135 were appealed to the Court of Appeals (the majority upon the construction of the clause "arising out of and in
the course of" the employment); 25 of which, however, were withdrawn. Only two cases went to the House of Lords.
Both the German and British experience under their compensation laws compares favorably with their previous experience
under the tort law,-in spite of the fact that by the change from
the lay"- of "tort" to the law of "compensation" the total number
of cases in which injured workmen are entitled to relief, and about
which consequently litigation may legitimately arise, has been
multiplied-in England at least-about nine or ten times.
The foregoing figures show how ridiculous are the frequent
accusations of the critics of the English compensation law that it
"has resulted in enormous litigation" and "fills the law reports
with cases of statutory construction." They also show how unjustifiable is the belief, entertained by many of our advocates of
compensation laws, that the substitution of official boards of arbitration or of administrative officers in the place of Courts of
Justice would reduce litigation. Issues of law and fact would
still arise, and would have to be tried very much in the old way, or
injustice, abuse and general harm would result. To abandon the
existing judicial machinery fora novel substitute, with its procedure,
practice, precedents, etc., yet to be"worked out, would be a perfectly useless change from one kind of Courts to another kind of
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Courts, and would result simply in a duplication of expense. It
should be borne in mind that the method of arbitration proposed
is compulsory, by standing boards of political appointees, and
would give none of the satisfaction of voluntary arbitration.
(5) The adjustment and final detcrmination of awards by
administrative officers has led in Germany to many abuses complained of, with some exaggerations perhaps, by Herr Friedensburg,' and later by Dr. Bernhard.' All the facts available indicate that the administration of the insurance law has been powerfully influenced by a desire to exercise liberality towards the unfortunate and governed by the spirit of benevolence rather than
of law. Experience everywhere demonstrates that such a policy
produces demoralizing effects and carries with it grave danger of
fraud and abuse. With us, such questions as are involved in the
making and review of awards always have been determined judicially, that is by Courts of Justice. And every lesson of experience is against depriving the parties affected of their rights to
judicial determination of such questions; for administrative boards
do not furnish adequate guaranty of impartiality or of strict adherence to law. The contention in mitigation, that the perversion
of a law of private rights to purposes of public charity reduces the
volume of necessary poor relief, is not supported by figures.
In Germany, this tendency to administer public charity out
of private funds is to some extent checked by the powers of the
employers' associations. But the prevailing idea of American
imitators of the German law is to raise the insurance funds by
taxation. Such funds would be public funds; and it is further their
idea that the original awards against the funds should be made by
political officers. Under such conditions, the rights of the employers' associations, in and to the funds or otherwise, would be
far different and far less effectually safeguarded than in Germany.
(6) There are serious political dangers incident to the control
I "The Practical Results of Working Men's Insurance in Germany," Ferdi.
nand Friedensburg. Translation, The Workmen's Compensation Service and.1ntjrmation Bureau, N. Y., x911.

$"The Future of Social Policy in Germany," Ludwig Bernhard, Prof. of
Pol. Science, University of Berlin, "Stahl und Eisen," Apr. x8, 1912.
3 I'enry IV. Farnam and Ernst Freund, in "Survey," N. Y., May 4, 19M2.
pp. 243, 245.
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of the associations, of their funds and of the rate making. In the
first place, the public functionaries having the regulation of the
insurance, have the individual employers at their mercy; they may
mould the constitutions and by-laws of the associations so as to
favor their friends and ruin their enemies; in assignments to associations they can dispense favors; by their control over rate making
they can likewise dispense favors and mar the whole scheme for
accident prevention. In the secontl place, assuming that the public officials exercise their powers of control properly, there still
remains the certainty of bitter political struggles, between the
private classes affected, for the control of the associations-such
control carrying with it the control of the common funds and of the
rate making. This is best illustrated in Germany by the use that
the socialists have made of their control of the sickness insurance
associations as means for the propaganda of socialism, and the consequent struggle on the part of employers (aided by a minority of
the workmen) to secure equal representation in the management
of those associations, even at the expense of higher contributions.
And even among the employers all is not harmonious; but the
different classes of employers are constantly "wire-pulling" for control. The German policy has been to form the associations of as
harmonious elements as possible; and as between the smaller and
greater employers to frame their constitutions so as to give control
to the latter. Will American politics permit the adoption of that
policy? If not, the smaller will outvote the greater employers,
and will unjustly impose the bulk of the cost upon them. Indeed,
whichever horn of the dilemma we should elect, an industrial civil
war would almost inevitably result.
In addition to the foregoing objections inherent in the German
law is the further objection that it does not fit our local cenditions,

because:
(i) It is suited to a people who are accustomed to paternalistic
governmental control of all their actions. It is impossible to explain-or for the average American mind to comprehend-the
multitude and minuteness of the practices of this kind incident
to the administration of the German law. But the following
examples will serve to illustrate: Injured workmen are obliged to
submit themselves to hospital or surgical treatment about as their

GERMAN IYORKMEIrS INSURANCE LAW

employers' associations may prescribe-subject to some check
from governmental regulation. And employers are obliged to
submit their private books and papers to the inquisitorial inspection of their competitors-if officials of their associations-and of
public officials, almost without check.
(2) It depends for its success upon an elaborate system-of
police registration and surveillance, for which there is no substitute here. What the police do in Germany in-the way of investigating accidents and injuries, identifying parties, checking frauds,
exaggerations, etc., etc., would have to be done here by some equal
force of equal efficiency, or the German scheme would here miscarry.
(3) Its low cost of administration is due in part to the free
use of the Post Office in making payments. In our States we would
have to organize a large, separate force for that purpose.
(4) It has succeeded only through almost perfect administration of the governmental functions, and an unvarying imperial
policy; whereas our administration is looser, and is apt to change
its policy with changing party administrations.
• (5) It is suitable only for a stable and homogeneous industrial
population and stable industrial conditions, whereas our industrial
population is fluid and made extraordinarily complex by immigration; and our small employers are constantly changing their industrial status-changing from the condition of employees to that
of employers and vice versa, and changing their businesses.
(6) Germany is large enough, probably, to furnish .an adequate distribution of risks in each trade association, without which
distribution insurance as to employers is a mockery and a misnomer, and worse than no insurance at all. But probably no
State in the United States is large enough to do that in all trades,
and consequently, if the German scheme were followed, there
would be many trade associations in which there would be too few
establishments with too small aggregate assets to provide anything like adequate risk distribution. Truly unfortunate would be
the plight of a responsible employer with a good business who should
be forced into a blind pool with a few comparatively irresponsible
competitors and saddled with a joint liability for the risks of all.
A good illustration of this has already occurred under the Wash-
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ington law, resulting from what is known as the Chehalis disaster
(7)The German scheme is suited to a state where employments generally are carried on continuously within the jurisdiction. But in each of our States there are many employers whose
employees work irregularly part of the time within and part of
the time without the State. Consequently, their premium rates
would have to be adjusted so as to apply to each payroll only for
the part of the time employed within the State. It would be a
very difficult task to apportion the payrolls accordingly. And
there would be many disputes, and many conflicts between the
Courts of different jurisdictions in applying their different laws
to transient and interstate employments.
(8) The German law shuts off all recourse to the Courts, and
leaves every question arising thereunder to be decided by administrative officials. Under our constitutions that cannot be done;
and according to the lessons of our political experience that should
not be done.
(9) The German law compels every employer, to whom it
applies, unconditionally, to enter into a contract of insurance with
a specified mutual insurance association. Under our constitutions that cannot be done.
(io) The German Industrial Accident Insurance Law delegates to the trade associations the legislative power to enact rules
and regulations for safety and to enforce the same in the establishments of their members by appropriate fines and penalties. This
power is the principal factor for accident prevention in German
industries. Under our constitutions such power cannot be delegated by statute. But it may be conferred by contract upon a
voluntary mutual insurance association. And approximately
equivalent results in the way of accident prevention are obtained
in England under a system of insurance in private companies'by a
correct differentiation of premium rates according to hazards.
There remain to be considered a few difficulties and pitfalls
in the way of an adaptation of the German Industrial Accident
Insurance. Law:
4Cf. "A Novelty in Legislation," by Will G. Graves of the Washington Bar,
Spokane, 1911.
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(x) As stated above, that law is intimately correlated with the
Sickness Insurance Law, which disposes of all injuries lasting less
than fourteen weeks, without trouble or expense to the accident
insurance associations. Without the sickness insurance, we would
have to extend the accident insurance so as to compensate for
injuries lasting over-say-two weeks. Such insurance would
be concerned with i very much larger proportion of injuriesthan
the German law-about 6o per cent. instead of 22 per cent.,-and
would cover the class of short time injuries in regard to which impositions are greatest and the ratio of expenses of administration
is highest. That difference would make all the experience of the
German insurance as to cost, practice, etc., etc., inapplicable, so
that in effect we would have to proceed without experience to
guide us. It is vain to consider devising offhand a system of
sickness insurance to serve as a basis for a system of accident insurance. For with our unstable and immigrant working population, sickness insurance is a.problem infinitely more complex than
work-accident compensation, and a problem such as no foreign
country has ever solved.
(2) The Industrial Accident Insurance Law is dsigned and
fitted to apply only to industrial employments (manufacture,
transportation and construction). And the entire. Accident Insurance Law does not cover all employments or even wage-earners
in all employments; and it is not appropriate therefor. Consequently, if we are seriously to imitate the German example, we
must prepare distinct and appropriate codes for industries, for
agriculture, for maritime employments, for commercial employments, etc., respectively, and must accurately and in detail define
the scope of these different codes, as conditions actually require.
Nothing could be more contrary to the spirit of their asserted model
than the crude schemes, applying sweepingly to all employments,
that have been proposed in America as adaptations of this German
law.
(3) The formation and organixation of the compulsory trade
mutual insurance associations is a problem that cannot be solved
satisfactuily simply by prescribing what trades shall form separate
associations, and then compelling employers to associate accordingly
and to work out their salvation as best they may, under the dicta-
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torial supervision of some state officials. Germany did not leap
in the dark like that. Before the German law was enacted, the
administrative'reguations were fairly outlined and agreed to and
the trade associations and their constitutions were tentatively
formed or projected. Care was exercised to form the associations
as far as possible of harmonious elements. The great Krupps
works were -made practically a, distinct association. The policy
adopted-tended to give control of the associations to the "captains
of industry." And the small employers, so far from being given
equal voting power with their larger associates, in some associations
have been relegated to "branch institutes," in the management
whereof they have practically no voice at all. In fact, there are
about a thousand details relating to the administration and regulation of the associations which in some way must be determined
and settled in advance before this complex scheme can be put into
operation successfully. And yet there is no indication that the
American advocates of the German model have given them even
the slightest consideration.
(4)In order correctly to follow the precedent of the Industrial
Accident Insurance Law, it is necessary to distinguish carefully
between compulsory mutual insurance and state insurance, and
to avoid taxation and bureaucratic management--as distinguished
from bureaucratic regulation and governmental assistance. The
German industrial employer is liable to his association for "assessments" to pay a quasi-contractual liability-he is not taxed;
the mutual associations' funds are private -not public funds, and
are managed by the associations, and not by public officials-although subject to public regulation; and the funds are disbursed by
the associations, and not by public officials-although the Post
Office assists. These distinctions are vital. And yet many in
America think that they are imitating the German Industrial
Accident Law, when they propose to resort to the exercise of the
power of taxation to raise the insurance funds, and when they confide to public officials the management and disbursement of the
funds. In fact, they are varying from essential features of their
model, and imitating in part either the Agricultural Accident Insurance Law of Germany, or the Norwegian law. It is not within
the province of this article to present the objections to these latter
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laws. It is sufficient to say that the merits of the Industrial
Accident Law of Germany cannot truthfully be claimed for either
of them.
Now to turn to the alternative-the English precedent.
The English Workmen's Compensation Law, applied to inidustria! employments, would be the simplest and least experimental
first step in the direction of wider social insurance; and yet in itself
-would entail no departure from our political principles and only
a slight change in our juridical principles--and that change one
which many of us believe is not fundamental.
It would remedy the one industrial evil which particularly
calls for immediate relief-the injustice of our liability laws.
It would not interfere with the accustomed usages and liberties
of our people.
It would adhere to our t'me honored practice of judicial determination of issues affecting private rights and liaibilities.
It would avoid absolutely all the dangers and abuses of bureaucracy inherent in systems like the German.
It would avoiu the political struggles over the control of trade
associations and the management and disposition of mutual funds,
inherent in the German system.
It would be a prudent experiment, adapted to further development ,or amendment; whereas the German system, once embarked
upon, can never be departed from without the embarrassments
of liquidating a heavy outstanding indebtedness.
Against the English law certain objections are currently insisted upon by some well-known publicists, who, on the other hand,
give the German law unlimited endorsement. These objections
will now be dismissed seriatim.
First: As to cost:
The critics referred to measure the cost of compensation by
the rates of insurance. That leads into grievous error.
The English insurance rates cover the total cost. The German
rates do not cover the cost of insurance-much of it is deferred.
The published German rates do not cover the expenses of management; which are extra, and are assessed separately.
In addition to the cost to employers in Germany, there is a
heavy cost to the public-and the cost to the public of an adapta-

82

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

tion of the German law would be higher in America. That cost
would consist of: (i) The cost of a field and office force to supervise and regulate the associations, their rate-making, and the collection, investment and disbursement of their funds. (2) The
cost of a great system of official boards of arbitration, with offices,
clerks, etc. (3) The cost of a force to disburse payments and to
exercise surveillance over claimants and pensioners. The total
cost of these three forces, if adequate for their duties, would be an
amount which the public would not tolerate; and if adequate
forces were not provided the whole scheme would miscarry.
The argument is frequently advanced that because the German
rates of insurance are lower than the rates charged for insurance
of compensation under the recent law of New Jersey, and because
the cost of management of insurance in private companies under our
tort laws amounts sometimes to 65 per cent. of premiums, while the
accredited cost of management in the German associations is only
about i5 per cent., therefore insurance under the German method
would be cheaper than insurance in stock companies of the direct
liability for compensation.
These arguments are both quibbles. Taking them up in
order:
The German rates are no indication of what our rates would
be under the German method, because: (x) Our hazard is at least
twice as great as the German hazard. (2) Our insurance would
cover all injuries lasting over two weeks instead of those only
which last over thirteen weeks; i. e., about 6o per cent. instead of
22 per cent. of injuries. (3) Our expenses of management would
be about three times greater than the German. Consequently, the
comparison between the German and the New Jersey rates furnishes no indication of the relative cost of insurance under a scheme
like the German and under the direct liability. The best indicator
of the relative cost of the two systems of insurance is to compare
the German with the English rates. Such a comparison shows that
the English rates average a little lower than the German rates,
although the latter have not yet reached the stage where they cover the
cost. And looking further into the German rates, it is to be noted
that the rates in Germany for some comparatively non-hazardous
trades are inordinately high. For example, the rate for tanneries,
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which in England is 0.75, in Germany is 8.23. Such startling
rates in Germany indicate that there exist serious dangers in the
German method of insurance.
As to the cost of management of insurance under the various
systems: That cost under our tort liability is no indication of what
the cost would be under a direct liability for compensation;and
consequently it is wholly deceptive to compare that cost with the
cost under the German system. The cost of management under a
settled direct liability compensation law in England is about 36.
per cent. The corresponding cost in Germany, it is claimed, is
about iS per cent. Nevertheless insurance in England is to be
had as cheaply as in Germany. And the cost of administering
insurance in America under an adaptation of the German law would
be about three times as great as the cost in Germany, because here
the scheme would lack the free assistance of the Post Office and of
an all-pervading police force, and because it would have to deal
with the short-time injuries, with which the German accident insurance is little concerned, and in regard to which the expenses of
management are relatively highest.
Consequently, it is difficult to form any estimate of the cost
of compensation insurance in America, particularly under an adaptation of the German system. But foreign experience gives us
every reason to believe that the cost in America of a system of insurance in imitation of the German would be infinitely greater
than the cost in Germany, and much greater, in the long run, than
under an adaptation of the English law.
Second. It is objected to the English law that it does not
tend to reduce accidents, whereas the German law does. Now it
is almost certain, although not .emonstrable, that generally-both
laws do tend to reduce accidents. Why then this invidious distinction? Because in England the volume and ratio of accidents
have increased, while in Germany it is the opinion of experts that
the law reduces accidents. But the volume and ratio of accidents
have corresponi;ngly increased in Germany; and it is the opinic.'
of experts that the English law likewise reduces accidents. Apply
the same test to both laws and they measure about the same.
A report, in i9o4, of a Parliamentary Committee appointed to.
investigate the workings of the Compensation Act of 1897, in which
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it was stated that the Committee could not see that that law had
had any effect in accident reduction, is often cited against the
English law. But expert industrial opinion is contra; and the
doubtful finding by that Committee is explained by the dictum of
the German experts that the effect of their law in the line of accident prevention could not be seen in statistics until it had been in
operation fifteen years. And a later British Departmental Committee on Accidents has reported as follows (to quote the summary
in the Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories for 19io):
"They find that while the accident risk probably remained almost
constant in the decade 1897-1907, any increase due to extended use
of machinery and greater pressure being counteracted by improved
inspection and by the greater care resulting from the Workmen's
Compensation Act, it has decreased since 1907, owing to the causes
aboe named and to the experience of employers in the efficient
guarding of machinery. They regard the increase of reported
accidents up to 1907 as due almost entirely to improvement in
reporting, which since that date has been less marked, so that the
effect of lessened risk has shown itself in the statistics."
Strong testimony in favor of the efficiency of the direct liability law of Great Britain in the way of accident prevention may
be found in the brief of Mr. John Calder, a leading industrial expert, filed with the Congressional Employers' Liability Commission,"
and in the testimony of Messrs. Cill and Clynes, M.P., before the
New York Employers' Liability Commission
Third. It is objected to the English form of compensation
law that it provides no security to injured workmen for the payment of their compensation. It is to be noted that this criticism
is not included in the sweeping arraignment of the English law by
Mr. Miles M. Dawson, in his brief filed with the Congressional
Commission on Employers' Liability (191 i); and the significance of
this omission is that in actual experience in England, there has
bwen almost no loss from the omission of any requirement of security! Looking at the subject practically, it is obviously far
5 Report of Hearings, Pt. 2, p. 768.
' Minutes of Evidence, 191o, pp. 8, 89.

I See testimony of Mr Gill, M. P., before N. Y. Employers' Liability Commission, M.nutes of Evidence, t9to, p. 8t.
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more needful to require of employers security for their contingent
liabilities for "damages" under our existing American negligence
laws, than it is to require security for the contingent liabilities for
compensation under the English law,-and yet we have never
thought it necessary to do so. Why then merely because one liability is substituted for another should the addition of a require-

ment for security be deemed essential? It is true that accrued
liabilities for long continuing pension payments under the compensation law subject the beneficiaries to the risk of their respective
employers continuing solvent during such periods; but it is easy
to require security for accrued liabilities without requiring general
insurance in advance. It is also possible that dummy corporations
may be resorted to to defeat the liability (a practice more probable
in America than in England); but in that event a particular remedy
can be adopted to meet that particular evil. It is also probable
that in America compulsory security may prove to be advisable
in some industries. It would be absurd, however, to subject all
industries to unnecessary bureaucratic domination or to launch
the state in an uncertain and expensive actuarial experiment merely
to forestall the possibility of an abuse that has not arisen in actual
practice.
Fourth. It is objected to the English form of compensation
law that it starts with a maximum strain upon industries. The
meaning of this is that, upon the adoption of such a law, employers,
if they insure, must start in abruptly to pay premiums sufficiently
high to establish reserves to cover the capitalized values of liabilities accruing during the period paid for-which premiums will undoubtedly be so much higher than the premiums for insuring the
liability for negligence as to cause some embarrassment at first;
whereas under the German system only payments due during the
first year need be provided foi by the first year's assessmentpremiums, and the future payments upon accrued pension liabilities may be left to be provided for by future assessments; and the
increase in premiums is thereby made gradual. But there are
serious objections hereinbefore explained, to the German method:
it is too much like issuing bonds to pay for current expenses.
And it is to be noted that British industries have passed through
the period of initial strain without material embarrassment, and
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now have the advantage of solvent insurance. And it is also to
be noted that all other countries except Germany have elected
to meet the initial strain of the increased liability at once, without
attempting to distribute it.
Fifth. It is objected to the English form of compensation
law that it withdraws a maximum amount of capital from industries. This objection is simply a corollary of the proceeding, and
means that the heavy premiums paid into insurance reserves are
withdrawn from industry, whereas under the German system employers are allowed to retain and use in their industries a large
part (i. e., approximately that part not yet due and payable to
the beneficiaries) of the mhoneys for which they are indebted for
compensation. The economic theory underlying this objection
requires demonstration; for it is the general opinion that the money
paid for insurance reserves is not locked up in vaults, but is invested,
and that a fair proportion of it finds its way back into industry.
Sixth. It is objected to the English law that it causes discrimination against the employment of the aged and defective.
This is an evil of disputed proportions. That it exists at all is
more generally denied.' But it is more reasonable to suppose that
employers do so discriminate considerably, not only because the
aged are somewhat more liable to injury (as appears from the German statistics), but also and more particularly because accidents
to elderly persons often lead to permanent disabilities caused not
so much by the injuries as by old age, and which consequently
obligate the employers to pay what are in effect old age pensions
in addition to compensation for the injuries. It is difficult to
form an estimate of the extent of this discrimination, because there
is, independently of this cause,.a universal preference for younger
men in taking on new workmen, particularly in the more hazardous
industries. If the objection is to be deemed material it may
readily be avoided by minor amendment to permit old men, etc.,
to contract for a sliding scale of compensation, dependent upon.age
or certified infirmity, as is now being advocated, in England. It
cannot be avoided by adopting the German Industrial Accident
Insurance Law, because that law by itself would cause about as
I See testimony of Mr. Gill, M. P., before N. Y. Employers' Liability Conmis.ion, Minutes of Evidence. 191o, p. 76.
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much discrimination as does the direct liability in England. It is
the Disability Insurance Law and not the Accident Insurance Law
that in Germany stills complaint of this discrimination.
Seventh. It is objected to the English law that it is not conducive to workmen's efficiency. It is commonly believed that
during the past half century the average physique of the English
working classes has degenerated, whereas the physical well being
and efficiency of the German working classes have increased. And
some of the panegyrists of the German law attribute this improvement in Germany to the Workmen's Insurance Law, and this real
or supposed degeneration in England to its compensation law.
There is only a modicum of truth in the former conclusion, and none
in the latter.
While the German Workmen's Insurance Law has undoubtedly
exerted a material influence in improving the contentment and wellbeing of the working classes and thereby in promoting workmen's
efficiency, it does not follow that this result is due to the distinctive
features of the IndustrialAccident Insurance Law, so that the effect
of the German system as a whole would have been any less beneficial had the direct liability for accidents been adopted instead of
compulsory mutual insurance. And it is a tremendous exaggera-.
tion to attribute the growth in German efficiency so exclusively to
the Workmen's Insurance Law alone, since widespread vocational
training, compulsory military service, an iron discipline and early
and wise child labor regulation are considered by many to have been
the principal factors in bringing about that result. Moreover
it is a vital mistake to attribute German industrial efficiency too
much to the workmen. German managerial and technical efficiency were famous before the workmen's insurance laws, and are
undoubtedly the ultimate cause of Germany's general efficiency
and prosperity. And the more one studies the subject, the less
becomes one's admiration for the German Workmen's Insurance
Law in comparison with one's admiration for the administrative
efficiency that has made those cumbrous statutes operate successfully.
Eighth. It is objected to the English law that it does not
provide for the medical care of the injured. A &omparison of the
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different policies of the German, French and English laws, will
aid to an understanding of this subject.
Under the German law, the employers' associations are obligated to provide medical care, etc., for injured workmen; but the
control of the whole matter-including control of the patients-is
given almost absolutely to the employers, subject to moderate
state regulation. The employers' associations seem to have
exercised their powers diplomaticalli, and the practice-except
for some incidental abuses--has worked well, producing good results in the way of cures.
In France, the employer is liable for the cost of medical care,
wherever*necessary, but the injured employee has the choice of
physician. This practice gives rise to many abuses, is uselessly
expensive, and produces the worst results in the way of cures, etc.
The English law places no obligation upon the employer to
furnish medical care, trusting that his self-interest to effect cures
as soon as possible will induce him (or his insurer) to furnish proper
medical care wherever necessary. The consensus of opinion
seems to be that generally it has resulted as expected; but it doe
not cause due medical care to be given so universally as does the
German law; and it has been construed to permit the expense of
hospital care to be deducted from compensation benefits, whichgenerally-is wrong.
The choice, therefore, ties between the English and German
practices. And it seems safer to follow the English practice, with
some modifications, at first.
Ninth. It is objected to the English law that it has caused
general dissatisfaction, whereas the German law, it is contended,
is generally satisfactory. In discussing this porposition, it should
be borne in mind that the comparison lies between the English
Workmen's Compensation Act and the German Accident Insurance Law, and not between the English Old Age Pension,
Sickness Insurance and Workmen's Compensation Laws, on the
one hand, and the entire German Workmen's Insurance Law, on
the other hand. And while as a whole and in many of its details
the German system is the more perfect and the more generally
satisfactory, yet the degree of satisfaction given by the accident
laws of the two countries respectively is about equal.
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The German Industrial Accident Insurance Law was at first
extremely satisfactory to employers, on account of its low rates;
but that cause of satisfaction has ceased, and as rates continue to
rise, dissatisfaction among employers is increasing. On the other
hand, the sudden and heavy increase in insurance rates caused by
the adoption of the Compensation Act of 1897 in England at first
made that law obnoxious to employers; but they have gradually
got used to it, and now satisfaction with it is general, at least
among industrial employers. No English employer with a wellequipped and well-conducted establishment would prefer the
German law.
The attitude of labor towards these laws is complicated by
socialism. In Germany non-socialist labor has generally been fairly
satisfied, and the accident law has produced better relations between them and their employers. The socialists, on the other hand,
were at first bitterly hostile to the insurance legislation, but have
since become fairly satisfied with the sickness insurance. With
the accident insurance, however, they remain dissatisfied, and
demand a part in the management of the associations and benefits
equivalent to ioo per cent. compensation regardless of fault. In
England, labor generally has been satisfied with the compensation
law.$ Recent declarations of British Labor Congresses against
that law have been coincident with socialist control of those bodies,
It is to be noted that the English socialists have not declared for
the German law, but for a state-insurance law, awards to be made
by political officers, and compensation to be on the oo per cent.
basis, with additional provisions for medical care, etc.
The impressions created upon American observers by the two
laws respectively are not conclusive. All have been impressed
by the completeness of the German system, and by the general
excellence of its administration. But when it comes to the Accident Insurance Law and particularly to the question of its applicability to our conditions, opinion is divided. But the preponder9 See testimony of Messrs. Gill and Clynes, Laborite Members of Parliament,
before the N. Y. Employers' Liability Commission, Minutes of Evidence, I~io,
PP- 75, 76, 84.
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ance of expert opinion is undoubtedly in favor of caution and of a
trial of the English system.2
We should not be overimpressed by the enconiums on their
law from the German officials. Naturally they are somewhat
prejudiced in its favor; and they are the last persons who should
be expected to cry aloud its weaknesses. The criticisms of such
men as Friedensburg and Bernhard are sufficient to show that all
is not satisfaction and perfection in Germany. That there is no like
official chorus of praise for the British law is due solely to the fact
that in Great Britain there is no established bureaucracy connected
with the administration of its law.
From the foregoing the conclusion is obvious. For us to adopt
substantially any integral part of the German Workmen's Insurance
Law would be a leap in the dark-it would be making the welfare
of our people the playfield of impulsive experiment, and would
entail a radical change in our political principles and in our social
and industrial habits and customs. Both the British and German
laws, although in different ways and to different degrees, are products of gradual development. Even if our ideal be a system of
broader and more perfect insurance than that provided by the
British law, yet prudence dictates a course of gradual approach.
The safest and most surely beneficial first step on that course would
be the adoption of an adaptation of the earlier form of the British

law.
P. Tecumseh Shcrman
New York, November,
10

1912.

See opinions of Farnam, Freund, Seager and Moot, in "Survey," N. Y.,
May 4, 1912, pp. 239, 243, 245.

